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TRADITIONAL concerns about business mergers within countries have
broadened during the past decade or two to encompass international
mergers as well. This development has reflected the substantial growth
since 1945 in the international flow of direct investment and the grow-
-r ing importance of the large, integrated international corporation. A
wide range of questions have been raised in the fast-growing literature
on these developments, including questions about the factors giving
rise to increased direct investment, the importance and characteristics
of foreign ownership and control, the benefits and costs of direct in-
vestment to the capital importing and exporting countries, and the non-
economic implications for the host country of having a sizable portion
of its leading industries owned and controlled abroad.
Much of this discussion has been foreshadowed by developments
in Canada, which received very large flows of direct investment be-
fore these became important elsewhere, and where foreign ownership
and control has long been enshrined as a major issue of public policy.
At present, nonresidents control over a third of the assets in major
sectors of the Canadian economy, including control over three-quar-
ters of the assets in the oil and gas industry, and three-fifths of the
assets in the mining and smelting and manufacturing industries. In
1966, direct investment by U.S. residents accounted for about 40 per
cent of the new investment in plant and equipment in Canada, corn-
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pared with 6 per cent for Britain and the Common Market countries.'
Despite the attention that has recently been given to foreign take-
overs in many countries, economic analysis in this area continues to be
seriously hampered by a lack of reliable data susceptible to meaningful
analysis. In 1969, the Government of Canada released a new and
unique body of statistical information on all foreign and domestic
mergers occurring in Canada from 1945 to 1961.2 These data signifi-
cantly enhance the range of information available on the subject. In
the discussion in Sections 2 and 3, the relative importance and lead-
ing characteristics of foreign take-overs are examined on the basis of
this information. In the remaining sections, an attempt is made to
identify and assess the importance of the leading determinants of
foreign take-over activity. Although the data do not extend beyond
1961, it is noteworthy that they cover the period when Canada ab-
sorbed a large share of the flows of direct investment to industrial
countries and when foreign control over Canadian firms increased 2
mostrapidly—from 25 per cent of the total assets of leading sectors of
the Canadian economy in 1948 to 34 per cent in Since the early
sixties, Canada has absorbed a much smaller share of total flows of
direct investment and the rate of increase in foreign ownership and con-
trol has remained virtually unchanged.4
1I•
Christopher Layton, Trans-Atlantic Investments. Boulogne-Sur-Seine, France, 1967,
J
Table C, p. 14.
2GrantL. Reuber and Frank Roseman, TheTake-Over of Canadian Firms, 1945—61 1
An Empirical Analysis. EconomicCouncil of Canada, Special Study No. 10, Ottawa,
1969. The present paper summarizes some of the main findings reported in this mono-
graph and presents the results of further analysis undertaken since this initial study was
completed. Details regarding the data and definitions employed in the current paper and ot
some of the estimates that are reported may be found in this earlier study.
Inaddition to the help received previously from those cited in the monograph, the
authors wish to acknowledge the helpful comments and suggestions made on an earlier
draft of the present paper by G. C. Eads, T. Horst, C. P. Kindleberger, and E. T. Penrose.
We are also indebted to Miss P. Skene, our invaluable research assistant. Throughout
this paper, the terms mergers,acquisitions, andtake-aversare regardedas synonyms cj.
andare used interchangeably.
These sectors include manufacturing, petroleum and natural gas, mining and smelting,
railways and other utilities, and merchandising. The figures are based on the book value
of capital employed in each industry. Dominion Bureau of Statistics, The Canadian
Balanceof International Payments, 1963, 1964 and 1965 and International Investment
Position, TableXIV, p. 127. DominionBureau of Statistics Weekly, February20, 1970, n
p.4. bi
From 1957 to 1960, Canada accounted for 35 per cent of gross flows of direct R
investment into industrial countries; the corresponding figure for 1961 to 1964 is 16FOREIGN TAKE-OVER OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES: CANADA467
A central feature of the research strategy adopted for this analysis
is the use of domestic mergers as a control group against which to
assess the importance, leading characteristics, and determinants of
ul foreign take-overs. Foreign mergers may be viewed simply as a part of
the more general phenomenon of business mergers common in most
iC countries. Accordingly, much of the theory and empirical evidence that
has emerged from the study of domestic mergers may be drawn upon to
In illuminate foreign merger activity as well.5 Moreover, if one wishes to
d- understand more clearly what influence international boundaries have
of on the characteristics of merging firms and the factors influencing
merger activity, it is helpful to compare foreign mergers with domestic







of FROM 1945 to 1961, over 639 foreign mergers occurred in Canada,
h1 compared with I ,l87 domestic mergers (as shown in Table 1). This
:2 ratio for the period as a whole compares with a ratio of I: 2'/2 for
7, the period prior to 1954 and roughly 1: 11/2 for the period after
1 The average value of foreign take-overs (total price paid divided by
a: number) increased over five times from 1945—49 to 1960—61, com-
0- pared with a twofold increase over the same period in the average value
• of domestic take-overs and in the price of business investment in new
• plant and equipment. From 1945 to 1949 the average value of firms
acquired in foreign take-overs was 29 per cent less than the average
•e.
Ut
is per cent. Marcus Diamond, "Trends in the Flow of International Private Capital,
1957—65." International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers, March, 1967, Table 2.
This approach would appear to be similar to that developed by Stephen H. Hymer,
ue asreported by Charles P. Kindleberger in his book,American Business Abroad. New
an Haven, Yale University Press, 1969, p. II. Hymer evidently argues that direct invest-
nt ment"belongs more to the theory of industrial organization than to the theory of inter-
0, national capital flows." For an excellent recent discussion of foreign investment, com-
bining the approaches of international trade theory and industrial organization, see
ct Richard E. Caves, "International Corporations: The Industrial Economics of Foreign
t6 Investment."Economica,Vol. XXXVIII,No. 149 (February, pp.1—27.































































































































Total 639 416 1,183
I
SouRcE: Reuber and Roseman, op. cit., Tables 3-1 and 3-2.
value of firms acquired in domestic take-overs. For the last five years
of our sample period, the average value of firms acquired in foreign
take-overs exceeded that of firms acquired in domestic take-overs by
14 per cent. In short, during this period both the number and size of
foreign take-overs increased relative to the number and size of domes-
tic take-overs.
In the remainder of this section, attention will focus on three
TABLE 1
Number and Average Value of Firms Acquired in Foreign and Domestic
Mergers and Number of Canadian Firms, 1945—1961
(valuesin thousands of dollars)
r
I
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additional yardsticks of comparison: the number of firms in Canada and
the United States; the number of employees in Canada; and the non-
resident control of Canadian industry.
NUMBER OF FIRMS
e About 100,000 companies filed tax returns in Canada in 1961,
compared with 1,200,000 in the United States in the same year. From
-) this perspective, the number of foreign take-overs in Canada has been
small, in no year exceeding 1/10ofIper cent of all companies in
Canada. Moreover, it is noteworthy that although companies in the
United States have outnumbered companies in Canada by a ratio of
about 12: 1, the ratio of foreign to domestic mergers has been 1:2. In
this restricted sense, there is prima facie evidence that the international
political boundary has mattered: apparently it has served to inhibit
considerably the take-over of Canadian firms by firms in the United
States. Otherwise, one would expect the ratio of foreign to domestic
take-overs to approximate more closely the ratio of the number of
firms in each country.6
Another basis of comparison might be the number of mergers in
the United States. Unfortunately, as already noted, the data on the
number of mergers in the United States are very incomplete, account-
ing, perhaps, for only one-third to one-half of the number of mergers
that actually took place. According to data released by the Federal
Trade Commission, 8,092 mergers occurred in the United States from
1945 to Arbitrarily doubling this figure to allow for underreport-
— ing,one may say that during this period, take-overs in Canada by firms
• in the United States, numbering 416, were equal to roughly 2.6 per
cent of the number of domestic mergers in the United States.
rs
8Ifone considers only border states in the United States—in order to allow for the
possible influence of distance and differences in industrial structure related to climate—
In the ratio of the number of United States companies to Canadian companies in 1961 was
)V about5:I.
Economic Concentration, Part 2, "Mergers and Other Factors Affecting Con-
•of centration." U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings before the Sub-committee on Antitrust
and Monopoly of the Committee of the Judiciary, S. Res. 40,89th Congress, 1st Session,
March 16, 17, 18, April 13, 14, 15 and 21, 1965. Washington, 1965, p. 504. Bernard A.
• Kemp, "Understanding Merger Activity— Assessing the Structural Effects of Mergers."
e The Bulletin, New York University, Nos. 55—56 (April, 1969), Chapter V and p. 57.470INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
The firms acquired in foreign take-overs employed about 105,000
employees at the time of their take-over. Those acquired in domestic
take-overs employed about 115,000 persons. In mid-i 953—midway
between 1945 and 1961 —the labor force engaged in nonagricultural
production in Canada was about four million. On this basis, one may
say that 2.6 per cent of the nonagricultural labor force in Canada was
affected by foreign take-overs at the time they took place, while about
2.9 per cent was affected by domestic take-overs.
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND NONRESIDENT
CONTROL OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY
Two main questions arise in connection with the balance of pay-
ments and the nonresident control of Canadian industry. The first is
the extent to which foreign investment for take-over purposes has been
accompanied by a transfer of capital to Canada, and to what extent it
has represented an increase in foreign control without a transfer of
capital.8 This is essentially concerned with changes in the supply of
foreign exchange associated with foreign take-overs. Unfortunately,
it is not feasible to analyze this question with the available figures.
Although the data on foreign take-overs indicate the amount of cash
paid when firms were acquired, they do not indicate how much of this
cash originated abroad, and how much domesticallyY
The second question concerns the extent to which the postwar
increase in foreign ownership and control over Canadian firms, re-
ferred to earlier, can be attributed to firms taken over by nonresidents
from 1945 to 1961. It is apparent that foreign acquisitions from 1945
to 1961, valued at the time of acquisition, account for only a relatively
small part of the assets controlled by nonresidents in various sectors
8 pointis discussed briefly by Charles P. Kindleberger, Op.Cit., pp.2—3 and p. 23,
where he claims that it is largely true that "direct investment does not represent a capital
movement."
Of the total price paid for acquisitions by foreigners from 1945 to 1961, at least 60
per cent was paid in cash —incomparison to the 51 per cent paid in cash by domestic
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of Canadian industry in 1962.10 For manufacturing, the estimated
ratio is 12 per cent; for mining and trade, 5percent; for transportation,
38 per cent; and for construction, 5percent. Within the manufacturing
sector, the largest ratios occur for leather, wood, paper, and non-
metallic minerals. Apparently, the level of assets controlled by non-
residents in 1962 mainly reflected (a) the acquisition and growth of
firms prior to 1945; (b)thegrowth of firms—after they were acquired
by nonresidents —duringthe years from 1945 to 1961; and (c) the es-
tablishment and growth of new enterprises undertaken by nonresidents.
3THELEADING CHARACTERISTICS OF
MERGING FIRMS
SINCE a more detailed review is available elsewhere, only a few of the
leading characteristics of merging firms will be discussed here." These
include the nationality of acquired and acquiring firms; the age, size,
and industrial distribution of firms; the degree to which acquisitions
were concentrated among acquiring firms; the profitability of acquired
and the market relationships among merging firms.
As for nationality, 82 per cent of the firms acquired by non-
residents from 1945 to 1961 were Canadian, 13 per cent were con-
trolled by Americans, and 5percent were controlled in Britain (omit-
ting cases where the premerger nationality of control was not reported).
Of the acquiring firms, 65percent were American, 27 per cent were
British, and 8 per cent were established in other countries. Four-fifths
of these mergers consisted of a single firm buying out a single firm,
and over 73 per cent of the foreign acquisitions were made through
Canadian-based subsidiaries. The median age and size characteristics
of firms acquired in foreign and domestic mergers may be summarized
as follows: 12
10 Forfurther details, see Reuber and Roseman, op.cit.. pp. 40—42.
"Ibid.,Chapters4 and 5.
"Becausethe distributions are highly skewed inthedirection ofthe larger classes,the
value of the mean is consistently greater than the value of the median.472 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
ForeignDomestic V.
MergersMergers
Age (years):All Acquired Firms 14.3 13.7
Acquired Firms of
Canadian Nationality12.9
Size: Sales (million dollars) 1.1 0.7
Assets (million dollars)0.7 0.4
Employees (number) 54 43
One may say that on the average, firms acquired in foreign mergers
were larger than those acquired in domestic mergers. Moreover, taxa-
tion data indicate that the mean size of firms acquired in both foreign
and domestic mergers was considerably greater—five to eight times
greater— than the mean size of all firms in existence in Canada, whether
measured in terms of assets or sales. This said, it is also worth noting
that about half of the firms acquired in foreign mergers had less than
50 employees, assets under $700,000, and sales less than $1 million;
three-quarters had fewer than 200 employees.
Because the coverage of the questionnaire was less complete for
those industrial sectors that do not come under the jurisdiction of the
Combines Act, the industrial distribution of firms acquired in foreign
mergers can be compared only very roughly with the industrial dis-
tribution of firms acquired in domestic mergers and the distribution of
the population of firms in Canada. The main point that emerges from
such a comparison is the relatively heavy concentration of foreign
mergers in the manufacturing sector relative to other sectors, to domes-
tic mergers, and to the number of firms in existence. The second most
important sector is trade, though in this sector foreign mergers are
relatively less numerous than domestic mergers and fewer relative to
the number of firms. These same general patterns are evident when one
considers the industrial distribution of acquiring firms. Within the
manufacturing sector, foreign acquisitions were widely dispersed
among various industries.
The evidence indicates that merger activity was less concentrated
among foreign acquiring firms than among domestic acquiring firms.
In both cases, a large majority of firms acquired no more than two firms
each. The nine foreign acquiring firms that made ten or more acquisi-
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The aggregate picture on the profitability of acquired firms may
be summarized as follows:
ForeignDomestic
MergersMergers
Median Profit Rate of Acquired
Firms Earning a Profit (per cent) * 17.0 18.7
Percentage of Acquired Firms Incurring Losses19.0 22.8
*ProfitRate =reportedbook profit as a percentage of reported net
worth.
One of the striking features of the profit picture which develops
when the figures are disaggregated is the extent to which acquired
firms in mining were less profitable than those acquired in other indus-
trial sectors: more than two-fifths of the firms acquired in both foreign
and domestic mergers were incurring losses, and the median rate of
profit for those earning a profit was about one-quarter of that earned
in other sectors. It is also noteworthy, however, that in the mining
sector, firms involved in foreign acquisitions were more profitable
than those involved in domestic acquisitions —inthe sense of having a
higher median profit rate and including a lower percentage of compa-
nies suffering losses.
Finally, there is the question of the marketing relationships pre-
vailing among merging companies. Consideration of this issue antici-
pates to some extent the discussion on reasons for mergers, since,
presumably, questions of market expansion and market power enter
into the decision to buy out another firm. From 1945 to 1961, the rela-
tive importance of mergers in the four broad categories of merger
types describing the direction Qf expansion of the acquiring firm was
as shown on the table which follows.'3
Unfortunately, the data are very incomplete in indicating the mar-
ket orientation and market position of acquiring and acquired firms
entering into mergers. Nevertheless, for what they are worth, the fig-
ures suggest that firms acquired in both foreign and domestic mergers
primarily served the domestic market. In the large majority of cases,
categories, together with various subcategories, are defined in Reuber and
Roseman, op.cit.,Chapter 5.
IF





Broad Horizontal: Horizontal 27 47
Geographic Market
Extension 14 12
Product Extension 11 9
Other 6 58 6 74
Vertical: Forward 20 11
Backward 11 31 7 18
Conglomerate: II 8
100 100
both the acquiring and acquired firms in foreign mergers held less than
a quarter of the market for their particular outputs. If anything, the
market share of firms entering domestic mergers was somewhat higher.
At the same time, the evidence —imperfectas it is —indicatesthat both
foreign and domestic acquiring companies tended to have a high rank
in their respective industries prior to merging, and that they improved
their market position as a consequence of merging.
Charles P. Kindleberger has argued that horizontal integration
reflects internal economies of scale, resulting in increased monopoly
power and, consequently, higher profits.'4 Vertical integration is said
to reflect external economies mainly. These are alleged to arise from
the improved coordination and planning made possible when industries
are integrated, as well as from a reduction in risk and uncertainty. To
• a considerable degree, such external economies may reflect pecuniary
gains due to the overcoming of market inefficiencies in coordinating
activities at several stages of production, and to the inability of the
market for technology to eliminate the rents from a technological mo-
• nopoly.
If one accepts this line of argument, the foregoing evidence on
types of mergers suggests that internal economies were an important
factor in both foreign and domestic mergers, and that the pace of corn-
petition may have been impaired by these mergers. At the same time,
• it is important to note that this factor, as measured by the share of
14Kiridleberger,op.cit., pp.19—25.I
4
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horizontalmergers, was less important for foreign than for domestic r
mergers. On the other hand, external economies—as indicated by the
share of vertical mergers —wereapparently a more important consid-
eration in foreign mergers than in domestic ones.
4REPORTEDREASONS FOR MERGING
ECONOMISTS generally tend to be skeptical about information obtained
from businessmen by questionnaires aimed at reporting the reasons for
their actions; and at least the usual dash of salt is justified in consider-
ing the evidence to be presented here. Respondents were asked to in-
dicate (a) "the reasons which led the reporting company or firm in this
instance to choose the merger route to expansion rather than to rely
on internal growth," and (b)"detailsof the economies, if any, secured
by the merger which were not otherwise obtainable." For various rea-
sons that are reviewed elsewhere, not much can be made of this evi-
dence. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to note a few of the main impres-
sions that it conveys.
One impression is that, in general, more of the initiative to under-
take mergers came from buyers than from sellers. Separating the rea-
sons reported into these two categories as well as one can, it appears
that demand factors and initiative from the buyer were relatively more
important than supply factors and initiative from the seller in about 73
per cent of foreign take-overs, and in about 65percent of domestic
take-overs.'5
On the demand side, two considerations stand out for both types
of merger: "it was cheaper and less risky to acquire another firm than
to build a new one," and "something unique was acquired through the
acquisition." These are scarcely surprising responses, but the under-
lying rationale given for them is of some interest. For the first state-
Thesepercentages relate only to those firms who reported reasons. For a review of
this approach, see E. T. Penrose, TheTheory of the Growth of the Firm. Oxford,Basil
Blackwell, 1959, pp. 158 if. This author also cites conflicting evidence on the relative
importance of demand and supply considerations in relation to domestic United States
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ment, the response from both foreign and domestic acquiring firms in-
dicates that considerable importance was attached to the speed with
which expansion could be achieved via a take-over and also to the gain-
ing of immediate access to an assured market. As for gaining control
over certain unique assets possessed by the acquired firms, the follow-
ing assets were particularly noted: management, particularly empha-
sized in the case of foreign acquisitions; know-how and processes;
licenses or permits from regulatory authorities, given greater emphasis
in domestic acquisitions; access to brands or trademarks, given par-
ticular emphasis in domestic acquisitions; trade connections, given
special emphasis in foreign acquisitions.
On the sellers' side, the most frequently given reason for merging
is that the firm was on the market and the "owner(s) wanted to sell."
Some mention is also made of the business being "available at a bargain
price." Although further details are not provided in many instances,
some of the more frequently identified considerations include such fac-
tors as retirement, and financial and competitive difficulties. The im-
portance of this latter factor tends to be supported in the case of
domestic mergers when one separates out profit and loss companies.
For loss companies, supply considerations are mentioned more fre-
quently than for profit companies. For foreign acquisitions, however,
losses by the acquired firm are cited much less frequently as a factor
leading to take-over than they are for domestic acquisitions.
4
Finally,there is the interesting question of the economies made
possible by expansion through merger. This question is of particular
interest as far as Canada is concerned because of the claim frequently
heard that Canadian plants are too small, or, where they are large,
that the output mix produced in them is too diversified to reap fully
the potential economies of large-scale production.'6 Again, the evi-
dence is not reliable enough to give more than an impression. Never-
theless, it suggests that mergers did not give rise to much by way of
cost reductions. Negligible or no economies were reported in 56per
cent of the foreign acquisitions reporting, and in 41 per cent of domes-
tic acquisitions. Such economies as were reported were largely con-
See,for example,D. J. Daly, B. A. Keys, and E. J. Spence,Scale andSpecialization
in Cunadian Manufacturing. Staff StudyNo. 21, prepared for the Economic Council of
Canada,Ottawa, 1968. Notealso the references cited there.1
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centrated in head-office actiyities, not at the plant level. The head-
office economies were reported to be largely savings in administration
and improvements in management. At the plant level, a few references
were made to savings in production and distribution costs.The most
striking result, however, is negative; no reference whatever was made
to reduced costs due to increased specialization as a reason for foreign
acquisitions, and in only 1 per cent of the responses on domestic ac-
quisitions was this factor mentioned.
5THEINTERINDUSTRY MIX OF FOREIGN
TAKE-OVER ACTIVITY
IN ORDER to explain interindustry variations in the ratio of foreign to
total (foreign and domestic) mergers in each industry, it is necessary to
define this ratio more precisely. Acquisitions may be defined in terms
of.the numbers of firms acquired in the ith industry or, alternatively, by
firms in the ith industry. The latter concept allows firms in one in-
dustry to acquire firms in other industries, as in vertical and conglom-
erate mergers. The former concept does not allow for this possibility,
and there is no particular reason why there should be a relation be-
tween the number of acqnired firms in an industry and the number of
acquiring firms in that industry. Since the characteristics of the ac-
quiring firms classified on an industry basis are important from the
standpoint of testing some of the explanatory variables that we intro-
duce later, N,b and Mib are defined in terms of the acquisitions made by
firms in the ith industry. A second definition, which is more restrictive,
limits and M,h to those cases where both the acquiring and acquired
firms are in the same industry, i.e., horizontal mergers. Thus, the two
ratios—the interindustry variation of which is to be explained—are:
+ M,b)and N111/(N11, + M,h), or NB, and NH1 for short.
The approach adopted to explain interindustry variations in these
ratios may be characterized as a search procedure intended to track
down the probable influence of various possibilities suggested by ad
hoc theorizing rather than an empirical test of a comprehensive pre-
specified theory of why such variations occur. This approach has been
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dictated in large measure by the absence of any corpus of theory on
this subject. Moreover, as will become apparent, the analysis has been
further hampered by a small set of observations affording only limited
degrees of freedom for testing hypotheses, as well as by a lack of satis-
factory statistical data for many variables that one might wish to test in
arguments explaining variations in the ratios in question.
In the series of experiments undertaken to explain variations in
these ratios for manufacturing, the following explanatory variables
were considered:
EN, =theratio of the number of foreign-controlled firms in in-
dustry i to the total number of firms, foreign
and domestically controlled (F,m), in industry I =F,,,!
+ Fm)
R1,the average tariff rate (duty collections ± value of im-
ports) in industry I for all imports
Rd. =theaverage tariff rate for dutiable imports
Q,= thetariff-induced differential in marginal costs in in-
dustry I
Ly1the supply of internally generated funds (capital cost al-
lowances + depletion allowances + profits —cashdivi-
dend payments) of profit and loss firms in industry I, rela-
tive to the size of assets in industry I, from 1948 to 1961 4
=theratio of the average size (total assets ÷ number) of
foreign-controlled firms in Canada in industry i (5,,,) to
the average size of all firms (S11) in Canada in industry I
ES,economies of scale in industry I
the average rate of growth in output in industry I from
1945 to 1961
PR1 =theaverage rate of profit for profit and loss companies in
industry i, relative to net worth in industry i, from 1948
to 1961
T1 =foreigntrade participation in industry i (imports + ex-
ports ÷ value added)
R&D1 =company-sponsoredresearch and development expendi-
tures in the United States in industry I, as a percentage of
sales in that industry in the United States
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The primary question posed in these experiments has been
whether there is any evidence of a statistically significant association
between variations in these variables and the interindustry mix of
• foreign merger activity, as reflected in the two ratios defined earlier. In
• order to investigate this question, a series of linear equations were
fitted by ordinary least squares to a panel of cross-sectional industry
data, including the foregoing variables singly, and in a variety of corn-
binations, as explanatory factors. In interpreting the results, particular
attention has been given to the value of the (-ratios and to the ap-
propriateness of the sign of the estimated coefficient for each variable,
to the stability of the estimated coefficient for each variable in succes-
sive tests, and to the value of the coefficient of multiple determination
adjusted for degrees of freedom, R2. For the most part, the statistical
analysis has been run on an eighteen two-digit industry classification.
Two-digit industry classifications are quite heterogeneous and, as a
consequence, may give rise to spurious results. In order to check out
this possibility, some tests, where feasible, were also run on three- and
four-digit industry classifications and on subperiods.
Before considering this evidence in detail, it may be helpful to
summarize briefly the principal results. The evidence indicates a
highly significant association between variations in the degree of
foreign control of Canadian industry, FN1, and NB, or NH1. Further,
after allowance has been made for a common element applying to all
industries, the estimates suggest that variations in NB, and NH1 tend
to be roughly proportional to variations in FN1. In addition, the esti-
mates provide evidence of a fairly significant association between
variations in NB, or NH, and in the level of tariff protection—and,
• also, in the supply of internally generated cash flows. On the other
hand, the little evidence does not warrant much confidence in an asso-
ciation between variations in NB, or NH, and in the indexes included
in the analysis relating to the size of firms, economies of scale, growth
in output during the sample period, average profit rates, trade participa-
tion, and research and development expenditures.
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SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS
Consider first the degree of foreign ownership, FN1. Suppose that
there are two industries, X and Y, and that nonresidents control 25 per
cent of the firms in X and 75 per cent of the firms in Y. Assume, also,
that foreign- and domestically controlled firms have an equal propen-
sity to engage in merger activity, are equally well placed to buy up
other firms, are equally likely to become aware of firms likely to be
for sale, have equal advantages to gain from mergers, and so forth.
All other things being equal, one might expect approximately 25 per
cent of the mergers in industry X and 75 per cent of the mergers in
industry Y to be foreign mergers, as we have defined them. In other
words, one might expect the distribution of foreign and domestic take-
• overs to be directly proportional to the initial distribution of foreign-
and domestically controlled firms. In its simplest form, this hypothesis
can be written
17
• NB, =/3FN1,where /3 =1. (1)
A variant of this hypothesis might allow for a constant differential, a,
between these two ratios:
NB,='a+/3FN1, (2)
The constant term, a, allows for a constant proportion of all
merger activity in all industries to be foreign merger activity even if
FN, =0.This common factor across industries might reflect various
influences, such as a difference between tax laws in Canada and the
United States, for example. As for /3, if one found its value was not
• significantly different from unity, one might conclude that foreign
ownership has little influence on the interindustry distribution of
foreign merger activity in the sense that variations in NB1 are pro-
portional to variations in FN,. If, however, /3 was significantly greater
than unity, one might conclude that foreign ownership enhanced for-
eign take-overs; and if /3 was significantly less than unity, one might
conclude that foreign ownership served to restrict foreign take-overs.
Here, and in the equations that follow, reference is made only to NB, but the empir-
ical estimates were based on both NB, and NH,.H
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The estimates of equation (2), based on an eighteen two-digit in-
dustry classification, are as follows:
NB, =0.191 + 0.890FN1; R2 =.56 (3)
• (2.41)(4.79)
NH, =0.206+ 1.OO4FN,; R275 (4)
(3.43)(7.15)
wheret-ratiosare shown inparentheses below the associated
parameters.'8
in both equations, the estimates of /3arehighly significant, lend-
ing, in addition, some support to the hypothesis that /3 is not signifi-
cantly different from unity—though, of coUrse, the best point estimate
• of /3 is that given in each equation. For equation (3), the probability of
mistakenly rejecting the hypothesis /3 1is about 50 chances in 100,
while for equation (4), it is about 97 chances in 100. Hence, using con-
ventional confidence limits, there is more reason for accepting the
hypothesis than rejecting it.Finally, the values of R2 may be con-
sidered quite high.
A number of qualifications related to the data should be noted.'9
First, .the definition of foreign control underlying FB, and FH, differs
somewhat from that underlying It made little difference to the
results when the definition of FN, was changed and the analysis rerun.
Secondly, relates to 1962— the earliest year for which this infor-
• mation is available—while NB, and NH, reflect take-overs during the
• period 1945 to 1961. Acquisitions during this period presumably had
some effect on the degree of foreign control at the end of the period.
This difficulty is unavoidable, and one cannot check on its probable
importance because of the lack of data on interindustry ownership and
control patterns prior to 1962. To the extent that this effect is unevenly
distributed among industries, the bias introduced may be unsystematic.
Whenrun on a four-digit-industry classification, equation (3) is as follows:
NB,=.129+.877FN1.
(1.75)(4.89)
•: "Forfurther details, see Reuber and Roseman, op.ci:., pp.116—117. The source of
FN,is:Corporationsand Labour Unions Rewrns Act, 1962. Ottawa,1965. Tables
4A—22A. The data for FN,aregiven in Reuber and Roseman, op.cit.. p. 119.482 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
TABLE 2
Selected Estimates of Equation (5): Seventeen Two-Digit Industries










Variable & /3 X3
1 NB, 8.625 0.846 0.976 R,, .70
(1.00) (4.93) (2.23)












4 NH1 14.60 0.981 0.567 R,, .80
(2.08) (7.05) (1.60)
















































































































a 16observations; food and beverages excluded.
b14observations; machinery, electrical products, petroleum and coal
products excluded.
Furthermore, given that the number of firms in Canada increased sub-
stantially from 1945 to 1961, and that throughout this period both for-
eign and domestic acquisitions accounted for only a small proportion
of the firms in thern country, it is not obvious that take-overs from 1945
to 1961 particularly constrained variations in FN1.
Equations (3) and (4) leave some 45 to 25 per cent of the variation
in NB1 and NH, to be explained in terms of factors other than foreign
control. Thus, one may expand equation (2) to includeX,, representing
other factors influencing NB1 and NH1,
(5)
Selected estimates of this equation, including a number of possibilities
for XV,, are presented in Table 2. It will be noted that the estimate of/3
remains highly significant in all of these tests, and that this coefficient
is relatively stable, with a value close to unity. The estimated values of
a, on the other hand, vary considerably in size and statistical signifi-
cance. The two additional factors that seem to be significantly related
to NB1 and NH1, according to Table 2, are the level of Canadian tariffs
and the supply of internally generated funds.
In the literature, it has long been recognized that tariffs tend to
stimulate inflows of direct investment—e.g., in the discussions on
Ir
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tariff 20_ anda number of empirical studies have tended to cor-
roborate the influence of tariffs on direct investment.2' The higher the
level of protection afforded an industry, the greater the incentive for
foreigners to increase their direct investments in that country. The
relevant rate for evaluating the influence on investment is the tariff-
induced differential in gross marginal costs, Q(resultingfrom the tariff
on both output and inputs), relative to the pretariff price of sales in the
importing country, rather than the nominal tariff rate on final output,
R.22
Equations (1) through (6) of Table 2 include either R or Qasex-
planatory variables, defining R, as the average rate of duty collections
on all imports, and Rd as the average rate of duty collections on duti-
able imports.23 The f-ratios for estimates of y indicate a statistically
significant association between NB, and R1. and Rd.,anda close-to-
significant association between NH, and these variables. On the other
hand, the estimated coefficients for Q1
24are highly insignificant, even
though, in principle, one would expect Q.tobe more closely related
20CharlesP. Kindleberger, InternationalEconomics, Homewood,Ill., Richard D.
Irwin, 1968,4th edition, pp. 110—112, provides a textbook example. Thomas Horst, in an
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation entitled "A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Amer.
ican Exports and Direct Investments," University of Rochester, 1969, formally derives
this conclusion using a behavioral model in which international firms choose an optimal
production-sales-export strategy on the basis of profit-maximization principles. Ronald
J. Wonnacott and Paul Wonnacott in Free Trade Betot'een the UnitedStates and
Canada, Cambridge,Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967, provide an extended
discussion of the relationship between tariffs and the location of industry, and empirical
evidence on this relationship for Canada.
21E.g.,Donald T. Brash, American Investment in Australian Industry, Cambridge,
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1966, inter a/ia (particularly Chapter III); Herbert
A. Marshall, Frank A. Southard, Jr., and Kenneth W. Taylor, Canadian-American In-
dustry: A Study in International Investment, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1936.
22 This conclusion is derived formally by Horst, op. cit., on the conventional assump-
tions made in the literature concerning effective protection.
23 R,. and R4, were estimated from detailed data provided by the Dominion Bureau of
Statistics. The data relate to 1966, which is well after the end of our sample period.
Unfortunately, earlier data were not available in sufficient detail. Although some tariff
changes occurred after 1961, it is assumed that these were not of sufficient importance
to invalidate the use of 1966 data for our purpose here.
definitions for Q are those derived by Horst, op. cit. He also kindly provided
the authors with his data. These data are necessarily subject to a number of limitations.
Suspicion about their quality is increased by the disparity between Horst's estimates of
nominal tariff rates by industry class and those derived by the authors from detailed
Dominion Bureau of Statistics data. The simple correlation coefficient between R,,, as
derived here, and the corresponding figure derived by Horst is .48.FOREIGN TAKE-OVER OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES: CANADA•485
to foreign merger activity than R. The most likely explanation is the
inadequacy of the statistics for Q,,whichhave necessarily been put
together from a number of sources and are subject to major difficulties
on several grounds.
Internal cash flow, Ly1, is the other factor that, according to Table
1, is significantly related to NH,,25 Ly, is negatively related to both
NB, and NH,; the (-ratios for the estimates of y are highly significant
in equation (8) but insignificant in (7). The rationale for this influence
is explored in greater detail in the next section. Its importance, as
emphasized by Kindleberger, arises from the growth of firms and from
capital-market imperfections giving large foreign firms access to
cheaper and more readily available funds for expansion.26
When all these explanatory variables are combined to explain
NB, and NH, one obtains
NB,17.296 + 0.866FN, + —169.320Ly,;R2 =.64(6)
(1.08)(4.87) (2.00) (1.04)
NH,37.327 + l.032FN, + 0.406R,. —291.690Ly,;R2 =.83(7)
(3.46)(8.60) (1.32) (2.52)
NB, =6.825+ 0.939FN, + l.29 (Rd, —169.320Ly,;k2 =.66(8)
(0.38)(5.47) (2.23) (1.04)
NH, =32.77+ l.064FN, + O.S68Rd, —317.495Ly,;R2 =.84(9)
(2.67)(9.04) (1.43) (2.84)
All coefficients retain the same sign as in Table 2, the coefficients for
FN, remaining highly significant and approximately unity. The coeffi-
cients for R, are generally smaller; the coefficients for R,1 and Rd, are
insignificant when NH, is the dependent variable, but both are fairly
significant in the equations explaining NB,. The coefficients for Ly,
also in size; they remain significant when NH, is the
Ly, =(capital cost allowances +depletionallowances +profits— cash dividend
payments)/(total assets) for profit and loss firms in industry i.1948to 1961. These fig-
ures were derived from the Department of National Revenue, TaxationStatistics. In
three industries the data were regrouped to approximate the classification for NH,and
NB,. These reclassifications are as follows: primary metals (FN,) = primary iron and
steel (tax data); metal fabrication = boilers and fabricated structural steel; machinery
= machinery n. e. c.
26 Kindleberger. American Business Abroad, pp. 17—18 and 23—25.r
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dependent variable and insignificant when NB, is the dependent van-
able. The values of k2 may be considered quite high for cross-sectional
data. A major problem with these relationships, of course, is that there
are only 14 degrees of freedom, which allows only limited scope for
cross-sectional variation.
As a further check on these relationships, the estimates were
rerun on data that excluded acquisitions by firms that did not have
operations in Canada prior to taking over a Canadian firm. This was
done on the ground that foreign firms with existing Canadian operations
are likely to be more comparable to acquiring domestic firms in terms
of knowledge of Canadian market conditions and access to information
about purchasable firms. This refinement did not materially alter the
pattern of significant associations shown in Table 2.
As a second check, the relationships were rerun on two sub-
periods: 1950 to 1955, and 1956 to 1961. The period 1945 to 1950
was excluded on two grounds: first, this period was marked by post-
war readjustment and the heavy inflow of foreign capital to develop
Canadian natural resources; and, secondly, the data for Ly, have been
published only from 1948 onward. Besides dividing the remaining
period into two periods of five years each, the end of 1955 represents
a peak in the number of foreign take-overs. Subsequently, the number
of foreign take-overs decreased rather sharply for two years, increas-
ing, thereafter, beyond the 1955 peak.
As is evident from the Appendix, in the estimates for these two
subperiods the coefficients for FN, are all highly significant statis-
tically, with t-ratios ranging from 5.9 to 2.8. The coefficients for Ly1
are statistically insignificant in estimates based on the first period, but
they are fairly significant for estimates based on the subsequent period
—with t-ratios ranging from 1.6 to 2.2. The coefficients for the tariff
variable are marginally significant for both periods when the de-
pendent variable is NB,, with t-ratios ranging from 1.0 to 1.3; however,
the coefficients for the tariff variable for both periods are insignificant
when the dependent variable isI-
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INSIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS
Among the other variables considered is the size of firm. In the
next section it is argued that take-overs are possible because of dif-
ferences in the constraints impinging upon buyers and sellers.27 if one
assumes that smaller firms are subject to greater constraints than
larger firms, and that international firms, F, are generally larger than
domestic firms,one might expect and NH, to be systematically
related to F,/S0. In statistical terms, however, it is difficult to define
F in a meaningful way. Defining F, as the average size of all firms, by
industry, in the United States was considered unsatisfactory, since
this would include a host of firms for which the prospects of taking
over a foreign firm are negligible. Instead, F, was defined in terms of
the average size of foreign-controlled firms operating in Canada, S,,;
the size variable becoming S,,,/S,,. In another set of tests, the total
value of the assets of foreign-controlled firms was related to the total
value of assets for all firms in the industry, + Aim).28 It 15
acknowledged that neither of these variables is very satisfactory, and
not much significance can be attached to the evidence shown in Table
2, indicating that variations in these size variables are not significantly
related to variations in NB, and NH, when these variables are added
to equation (2).
Economies of scale in various industries, ES, is a related and
equally difficult factor to take into account. The best available
measure of economies of scale at the two-digit industry level in
Canada is that derived by C. J. Hodgins,29 using a cross-sectional
analysis of establishment data based on a production-function ap-
proach. As the study emphasizes, these estimates are subject to many
limitations, not the least of which is the question of product mix re-
This view is elaborated in Penrose, op.cii.pp.156 if., and also in Kindleberger,
AmericanBusiness Abroad, Chapter1. Kindleberger discusses these constraints within
the context of monopolistic competition.
2M Data for A,,1I(A+Aim)and are for 1962, and were derived from Corpora-
tionsand Labour Unions Returns Act, 1962. Ottawa,1962, Tables 4A—22A.SeeReu-
ber and Roseman, op.cit., p.119.
C. J. Hodgins, "On Estimating the Economies of Large-Scale Production: Some
Tests on Data for the Canadian Manufacturing Sector." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Chicago, 1968.
0r
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ferred to earlier. Hence, it is uncertain whether the failure to find a
significant association between ES, and NB, and NH1 reflects the lack
of any association or the inadequacy of the information available on
economies of scale.
Another variablethatisgiven considerable prominence in
theories of the firm is growth, G, here defined as growth in output
from 1945 to 1961One might argue that the more rapid the rate of
growth in an industry, the more apparent will become the differences
in the constraints impinging upon firms; moreover, these disparities
may actually widen. If because of their size and diversity, their inter-
national characteristics, and other factors, the constraints bearing on
foreign firms are less stringent than those bearing on domestic firms
(including domestic buyers as well as sellers), one might expect NB,
and NH, to be positively related to growth rates across industries.
When tested empirically, however, on the basis of equation (5), the co-
efficient of G is highly insignificant statistically.
A further possible influence on the interindustry mix of foreign
merger activity might presumably be the profitability of industries,
PR.3' Although this influence could be either positive or negative, one
might very well think it more likely to be positive for at least two
reasons. First, profitability might reflect the growth of the industry,
which, as suggested earlier, one might expect to be positively asso-
ciated with NB, and NH,. Inclusion of a profits variable on this
rationale provides an indirect test of the growth hypothesis. Secondly,
one might argue that foreign firms, less constrained in a number of ways
than their domestic counterparts, could out-compete domestic firms for
the acquisition of firms in more profitable industries, leaving those
firms in less profitable industries for domestic absorption. This ra-
tionale is doubtful on logical grounds, since, presumably, the price paid
for firms reflects their profitability in different industries. Neverthe-
less, it conforms with the picture painted in some popular commen-
E.g.,Kindleberger, American Business Abroad, pp.6 if'. G is equal to the percentage
change in the index of industrial production in industry i from 1946—47 (average) to
1960—61 (average). Dominion Bureau of Statistics, General Review of the Manu-
facturing Industries of Canada, 1961, Tables 5 and 6.
PRis the unweighted average profit on net worth before tax, 1948 to 1961, as re-
ported in Department of National Revenue, Taxation Statistics.I
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taries, depicting foreigners as taking over the most profitable sectors
of the Canadian economy and leaving the dregs to local residents. The
estimates of equation (5) do not confirm this picture. In fact, the co-
efficient for PR is consistently negative, suggesting exactly the op-
posite picture. In many of the tests run, the coefficient was insignificant,
but in some it was significant. This result may be rationalized on the
ground that profits have an effect on internal cash flows, which, in
turn, according to the evidence presented earlier, influence foreign
merger activity. With lower profits, cash flow is lower, thereby en-
hancing the probability of foreign take-overs, and vice versa.
Still another variable to be considered is trade participation, T1.32
This variable was included on two grounds. First, foreign-trade partici-
pation might reflect the degree of competitive pressure prevailing in an
• industry, which might conceivably be reflected in foreign take-over
activity. Secondly, foreign-trade participation might serve as an index
of import substitution and export prospects, which presumably might
also influence foreign take-over activity. The estimates offailed,
however, to suggest a significant association between T1 and either
NB,or NH1.
The final variable to be considered is research and development
expenditure, R&D1.33 During the past decade, Raymond Vernon and
others have focused considerable attention on this factor as an in-
fluence on international trade and investment.34 The evidence ad-
duced indicates a positive association between R&D expenditures in
32Based on United Nations data on sources of exports and imports, classified on a
• two-digit-industry basis, and on the Dominion Bureau of Statistics census of manu-
facturing data on value-added, also classified by two-digit industries. All data relate to
1964.
° Data provided by Thomas Horst, op.Cit.,based on National Science Foundation,
Researchand Development in Industry, Annual Report, 1963, andU.S. Department of
Commerce, Censusof Manufacturing, 1963. Inaddition, estimates were made using (i)
• R andDexpendituresin the United States, by industry, for the years 1958 to 1961
(excluding tobacco, leather, and printing); and (ii)R andDexpendituresin Canada ±
RandDexpendituresin the United States, by industry, in 1963. These data were com-
piled from National Science Foundation, BasicResearch, Applied Research and De-
velopment in Industry, 1964, andDominion Bureau of Statistics, IndustrialResearch
and Development Expenditures in Canada, 1965,p. 22, Table 3. The coefficients for
R&DIremainedinsignificant for both of these definitions of the variable.
E.g., William Gruber, Dilup Mehta, and Raymond Vernon, "The RandDFactor
in International Trade and International Investment of United States Industries." The
Journal of Political Economy, Vol.75, No. 1 (February, 1967), pp. 20—37, and the refer-
ences cited there.490 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
the United States and the propensity to undertake direct investments
abroad. The theoretical rationale for this view is open to questions
so far as trade and investment relationships between Canada and the
United States are concerned, since it is not apparent why a firm with
an advantage over its competitors in R&D should choose to establish
subsidiary operations rather than to export its products.35 The empiri-
cal evidence also raises some questions. For example, the information
available suggests that foreign subsidiaries in Canada undertake as
much R&D expenditure on the average as do domestically controlled
firms.36 If firms go abroad because of the advantage which R&D ex-
penditure at home gives them in foreign markets, one might expect
their R&D expenditures in the foreign market to be less than that of
local firms. Nevertheless, leaving these and other questions aside,
R&DZ was included in equation (5). As indicated in Table 2, there is
no evidence of a statistically significant association between and
the relative level of foreign take-over activity.
There are a number of additional variables that one might wish to
consider. Among these are the degree of concentration in various in-
dustries, the extent of merger activity in the corresponding industry in
the United States—on the assumption that foreign merger activity in
Canada in large part reflects a spillover of merger activity in the United
States —andthe incidence of commercial failures in various industries.
A lack of satisfactory data precluded experiments with these and other
4
possibilities.
35Two general reasons are suggested by Gruber, Mehta, and Vernon (ibid.,p.21)
for a relation between R and D and foreign investment: (i) the large-scale marketing of
technically sophisticated products demands the existence of local facilities; and (ii)
investment is necessary to protect the technology-based oligopoly of United States
producers against infringement by other foreign producers and local producers. These
reasons are not very persuasive as far as Canada is concerned: Not only is United
States production located in close proximity to the Canadian market, but also local Cana-
dian markets are frequently closer to United States producers than to Canadian ones.
Moreover, leaving aside the tariff, it is not very convincing to suggest that any tech-
nology-based oligopoly which the United States may have in Canada is seriously
threatened by competition from abroad, or by local competition—especially when this
technology-based oligopoly is based on the principle of "keeping ahead of the pack" (as
it appears to be in these discussions) rather than on a once-for-all differential which,
over time, might become eroded as outside technology caught up with that in the United
States.
A. E. Safarian, Foreign Ownership of Canadian Industry. Toronto,McGraw-Hill,
1966, pp. 281—282.FOREIGN TAKE-OVER OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES: CANADA•491
6MACROECONOMICINFLUENCES AND
INTERTEMPORAL VARIATIONS IN FOREIGN
TAKE-OVER ACTIVITY
IN ORDER for a foreign merger to occur under competitive market con-
• ditions, the net present value of a local firm to a foreign buyer, NPV1,
must exceed its net present value to the local seller, NPV8, and to all
potential domestic buyers, NPVb. It is apparent that a variety of dif-
ferences in market circumstances and constraints impinging upon
foreign buyers compared with those impinging upon domestic buyers
and sellers might arise, which would result in NPV1> NPVb> NPV8.
On the demand side, there may be differences in expectations about
market demand, differences in access to markets and market informa-
tion, differences in access to marketing skills, differences in product
range, and so forth. On the supply side, there may be differences in the
price and access to factor inputs and financial resources, differences in
the access to technology and managerial skills, differences in risk and
• attitudes toward risk-bearing, differences in the length of the planning
horizon, differences in access to scale economies, as well as other fac-
tors. Eor the most part, smaller firms seem to be subject to more
stringent constraints on both the demand andsupply sides than are
larger firms, reinforcing the tendency for larger firms to absorb smaller
ones.
Related to this is the question of why foreign firms choose to buy
existing facilities rather than to establish new facilities. Presumably
this is because the NPVS of firms taken over is less than the cost of
establishing comparable new facilities —includinggoodwill and other
intangibles—and of overcoming other barriers to entry.
In examining the influence .of general economic conditions on
year-to-year variations in the number of foreign mergers, one is in
effect attempting to identify the particular features of the economic
environment that give rise to year-to-year variations in NPV1 relative
to NP '1b and NP VS. The investigation of this question reported below
is based on time-series analysis, applied by fitting a series of linear
equations by ordinary least squares to annual data for the period 1945
to 1961. The first part of the analysis—like that in the previous sec-F
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tion—is essentially a search procedure, while the second part reports r
onseveral tests performed on the relationships that emerged from this
search.37
In the tests undertaken in the first part of the analysis, the follow-
ing variables were considered: t
A =thenumber of mergers in the United States
F =thenumber of commercial failures in Canada
L =thesupply of funds generated internally in Canadian corpora-
tions; the level of business activity in Canada, as measured by
the level of unemployment, U; the index of industrial produc-
tion, 1; and profits per unit of manufacturing output, ir
Z =thelevel of stock prices in Canada
xdeviations in Canada's foreign-exchange rate from $1.00
Canadian= $1.00 U.S.
the level of short-terth interest rates in Canada
=thelevel of short-term interest rates in the United States
1' =thedifference between short-term interest rates in Canada
and the United States, i.e., I —
= thedifference between the level of stock market prices in
Canada and the United States
Vthe income velocity of circulation of money, as a proxy for
credit conditions (money stock ÷ GNP)




The "best" estimate emerging from these experiments is
N =3.32+ 0.0677A + 0.0329F —20.46L.
(5.15) (3.40) (2.17) (10)
k2=92DW=2.77
The analysis concentrates throughoutonthe number of mergers, rather than on the
value. The value of mergers reflects not only the number of firms but their average value,
which can be expected to vary widely because of the size of the firms taken over andFOREIGN TAKE-OVER OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES: CANADA•493
s N is the number of foreign mergers and DW is the Durbin-Watson
s statistic. In effect, this relationship suggests that variations in the
number of foreign take-overs in Canada can be largely explained by a
spillover of merger activity in the United States, conditioned by varia-
tions in the level of business activity in Canada and the liquidity of
Canadian corporations. The rationale for including these variables and
details on the tests run are discussed elsewhere; only a summary is
presented here.38
As noted at the outset, a central premise of the methodology Un-
y denying this paper is that foreign take-overs in Canada may simply be,
to a considerable extent, a manifestation of the more general phenom-
• enon of industrial mergers occurring in North America. If so, one would
expect a highly significant positive association between A and N, as
•
.0 is, in fact, indicated by equation (10) and all other tests run. A may be
viewed as an index of the propensity of firms in the United States to
engage in merger activity, reflecting attitudes toward long-run eco-
nomic prospects, the most efficient method of expanding output and
a markets, attitudes toward market strategies, Views about probable
future developments with respect to antitrust laws and law enforce-
ment, and so forth. The merger literature for the United States fre-
quently refers to the merger "waves" that have occurred in the past,
r and attempts have been made to explain these waves, in part, at least,
in terms of underlying attitudes and motivation of businessmen toward
mergers.39 If this applies within the United States, it is equally plau-
sible to expect the propensity of businessmen to engage in merger ac-
otherfactors. At the same time, the average value of the firms taken over may have little
or no relation to the reasons why firms are taken over, which is our primary interest
here. A number of tests were run on the value of firms, but these seemed inconclusive
and unpromising.
Reuber and Rosernan, op. cit., Chapter 7; Grant L. Reuber, "Antitrust and the Take-
Over Activity of American Firms in Canada: A Further Analysis." The Journal of Law
and Economics, Vol. XII (October, 1969), pp. 405—417.
Econo,nic Concentration (cited in full in footnote 7): testimony by Mueller, pp.
505—508; Ralph L. Nelson, Merger Movements in American Industry. 1895—1956, New
York, NBER, 1959, ChapterS; Jesse W. Markham, "Survey of the Evidence and Find-
7 ings on Mergers," in Business Concentration and Price Policy, New York, NBER. l955,
pp. 146—154; George F. Stigler, "Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," in Readings in
e Industrial Organization and Public Policy, The American Economic Association,
Richard B. Heflebower and George W. Stocking, eds., Homewood, Ill.. Richard D.
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tivity to be a factor influencing their merger activity in Canada. In ad-
• dition, variations in A may serve as an appropriate proxy variable for
a variety of economic factors that directly influence the willingness of
• firms in the United States to undertake mergers—such factors as credit t
• conditions in the United States and changes in the business outlook.
To the extent that A reflects underlying attitudes to merger activity in C
the United States and the effects of contemporary economic conditions, S
variations in A can be expected to reflect changes in the demand for e
Canadian firms. By including A in the relationship, one is, in effect,
directly posing the hypothesis that take-overs in Canada by firms in the
United States reflect, to some extent, a spillover of merger activity in
the United States.
The other explanatory variables included in equation (10) reflect
variations in economic conditions in Canada, which, though similar,
are not identical to variations in economic conditions in the United
States. The supply of internally generated funds, L, is negatively re-
lated to N, which is consistent with the evidence presented in the pre-
vious section. As internally generated funds become less readily avail-
able among Canadian corporations, the cost of capital can be expected
to rise for both potential domestic buyers and sellers of local firms.4°
Ceteris paribus, NPV, will rise relative to NPVb and NPV5 as a con-
sequence. It is evident that, to some extent, the supply of internally 9
generatedfunds in Canada can be expected to vary independently of
4
thesupply of such funds in the United States. Moreover, variation in
the supply of internally generated funds in the United States is allowed
for separately, to some degree, via variations in A. In addition, since
many acquiring foreign firms are larger than domestic firms, and have
much more diversified and easier access to outside funds, any general
reduction in corporate liquidity and tightening of credit conditions in
North America can be expected to place foreign firms at an advantage
relative to domestically owned Canadian firms— in other words, NPV,
will tend to rise relative to NPVb and NP VS.41
Fora theoretical elaboration of this view, see James S. Duesenberry, Business
Cyclesand EconomicGrowth. NewYork, McGraw-Hill, 1958, Chapter 5.
Evidencethat the incidence of tighter credit conditions is greater for small firms than
for large firms is available from a variety of sources, of which three may be noted:
Employment, Growth and Price Levels, "Answers to Questions on Monetary Policy
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The number of commercial failures in Canada, F, is positively re-
lated to N. This association seems plausible for at least three reasons:
(a) F relates to economic conditions in Canada and, therefore, is likely
to have a more direct effect on local firms than on foreign firms, which
will be influenced by foreign economic conditions as well; (b)theeffect
of business conditions on foreign demand for Canadian firms will to
some extent be reflected in A, leaving F to reflect mainly the partial
effect of this factor on the supply side of the market; (c)althoughown-
ers may prefer to hold on to firms for a variety of noneconomic rea-
sons as profits decline, this preference can only be indulged up to the
point where bankruptcy is imminent. At that point, the pressure to
give up the business is irresistible. Consequently, one would expect
an increase in bankruptcies to be associated with an increase in merg-
ers, and vice versa.
Two further points may be noted in connection with equation (10).
First, the value of k2isquite high, indicating that the relationship ex-
plains over 92 per cent of the variation in N, while the value of DW
gives no evidence of significant autocorrelation in the residuals at the
95 per cent confidence level. Secondly, F and L are highly collinear
(r= .97),which can be expected to reduce the size of the estimated
1-ratios. Because of this bias, the association between these variables
and N is probably even more significant than is suggested by the es-
timated 1-ratios for the coefficients of F and L.
In the course of developing equation (10) an alternative relation-
ship was developed, which, on strictly statistical grounds, is as satis-
factory as equation (10).
N =41.95—2.195Z' +0.334Z —l9.443ja+ 5.080t —8.Ol5U.(11)
(7.51) (2.07) (5.45)(3.90)(3.46)
R2=97DW=2.30
This relationship is consistent with equation (10) in pointing to much
the same general influences on foreign mergers in Canada. At the same
time, it does not lend itself as easily to sorting out the influence of
gress, 1st Session,Washington, 1959, pp. 1773—74; Bank of Canada, Annual Report.
/959, p.6; John H. Young and John F. Helliwell, "The Effect of Monetary Policy on
Corporations," Report of the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance. Appendix
Volume, 1964, Ottawa, 1965, p. 387.F
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merger activity on the part of firms .in the United States, on the one
hand, and domestic influences, on the other. In addition, the tests to
which each relationship was exposed indicated that equation (10) is
preferable in a number of respects.
The rationale for including the explanatory variables in equation
(11) will not be considered here at any length. Two of these variables
(as well as some of those listed earlier) have been rationalized and
pointed out as important in studies on merger activity in the United
States: the current level of economic activity (as reflected by U or I
or ir) and the level of stock market prices.42 Z' may be rationalized on
the ground that variations in Z' reflect variations in the cost of capital
between Canada and the United States, although it is conceded that
it may reflect other influences as well. Variations in 1amaypresumably
be viewed as a proxy for variations in credit conditions in the United
States. And t,asalways, is included to allow for a variety of broad
secular factors about which we know little or nothing.
No satisfactory and statistically significant association was es-
tablished in any of the tests run between N and the other variables
listed earlier—x, I, ir,i',V, and D. A special word might be said about
D-.-changes in antitrust laws and law enforcement in the United
States; and x—the exchange-rate variable. It has been suggested that
because of tougher antitrust laws and law enforcement during the
1950's, companies in the United States embarked on increased take-
over activity in Canada.43 As discussed elsewhere, this hypothesis
does not stand up when it is examined in the light of the more compre-
hensive questionnaire data now available and the employment of more
rigorous tests based on equation As for the exchange rate, one
would expect this variable to be insignificant, since both the purchase
price and future returns on the investment are denominated in foreign
exchange from the standpoint of the foreign buyer. Moreover, since for
most of the period in question, Canada had a free exchange rate, pe-
culiarities related to the possible over- or undervaluation of the ex-
change rate do not enter the picture.45
Mueller op. cii., pp.505-508;Nelson, op. cit.; Markham, op. cit.
C.J. Maule,"Antitrustand the Take-Over Activity of American Firms in Can-
ada." TheJournalof Law and Econo,nics (October, 1968), pp. 423—432.
"Reuber,bc. cii.
Professor Kindleberger has pointed out that German authors, in particular, have
sometimes ascribed U.S. investment in Germany to the overvaluation of the dollar in
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TESTS OF THE RELATIONSHIPS
Two relationships that seemed to explain changes in foreign
mergers reasonably well having been derived; both were subjected to
three tests.46 The first test was to determine how plausible each rela-
• tionship looked when fitted to data on the number of domestic take-
overs. The second test was to see how well each relationship stood up
to disaggregation. The third test was to assess the predictive power of
each.
When M, the number of domestic mergers,was substituted for N
in the initial tests of equations (10) and (11), the coefficients of all the
explanatory variables except A and Z were insignificant. The "best"
relationship explaining M was:
M =2.44+ l.894Z —32.52L. (12)
(6.31) (3.19)
k2=89DW=1.69
When A was added to this relationship, its coefficient was insignificant.
Equation (12) is consistent with evidence for the United States cited
earlier, indicating a relationship between stock-market prices and do-
mestic mergers.47 In addition, it reemphasizes the role of corporate
liquidity.
The tests using disaggregated data were based on the following
components of N: (a) acquisitions of only those firms previously con-
trolled in Canada; (b) acquisitions in the manufacturing sector of the
economy of Canadian firms and all firms; (c)acquisitionsin the trade
• sector of Canadian firms and all firms; and (d) firms acquired in broad
horizontal mergers, and in nonhorizontal mergers. Comparing the signs
and t-ratios of the estimated coefficients for the explanatory variables,
one may summarize the results of these disaggregative tests as follows:
(a) The signs of the coefficients of all the explanatory variables
in the equations based on equation (10) are consistent and conform
with the signs of the corresponding coefficients in the aggregate equa-
are described in detail in Reuber and Roseman, op.cii., pp.152—172.
It is also consistent with econometric evidence indicating that increases in stock-
market pricesinCanada, presumably reflecting an anticipation of business prospects,
are significantly and positively related to new investment in plant and equipment.498 •INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
lions. The same is true of the constant term with one exception.
(b) The values of R2 are consistently high, and the values of DW
give no evidence of significant autocorrelation in the computed resid-
uals at the 5 per cent confidence level.
(c)Thelevel of significance remains fairly high for the estimated
coefficients in the disaggregated equations. The coefficient for A is
significant in all cases; the coefficient for F is significant in seven of the
nine cases; and the coefficient for L is significant in five of the nine
cases.
(d)Comparingthe performance of equation (11) with that of
equation (10), one finds (i) somewhat less consistency with respect to
the signs of the estimated coefficients, (ii) somewhat lowerfor the
corresponding estimates based on equation (10) in six of the nine cases,
and (iii) somewhat fewer—and a less consistent pattern of—significant
(-ratios. These considerations, combined with the fact that equation
(11) is based on 11 degrees of freedom compared with 13 for equation
(10), suggest some preference for the latter.
One danger of concentrating attention on the number of mergers
is that one may be unable to detect influences on merger activity that
are related to the size of the acquired firm. Accordingly, it is particu-
larly significant that relationships (10) and (11) stood up well on the
foregoing basis when they were reestimated for small (less than 50
employees) acquisitions (N8) and larger (more than 50 employees) q
acquisitions (N,).48
The use of predictive tests was seriously impaired because the
data could not be satisfactorily updated beyond 1961, as had originally
been hoped. A much weaker test was devised, in which each relation-
ship was fitted to the two subperióds 1945—59 and 1947—61. The
power of each of these reestimated relationships to predict the two
years preceding, or following, each of these subpenods was then corn-
48 N8=—4.77+ 0.033A + 0.0084F —4.09L;R' =.84
(3.71)(1.28) (0.64)
N, =2.90+ O.024A + 0.015F —9.60L;R2 =.90
(3.84)(3.20)(2.11) J
N8 =22.13+ 0.042Z —I.231Z'— —2.83U+ 1.761; R2 =.96
(5.07)(8.44) (3.36)(2.41)(2.66)
N, =10.93+ 0. 18Z —0.58Z'—6.80i—3.52U+ 2.061; R2.82
(1.20)(2.10)(1.99)(1.59)(1.65)1•
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• pared with the other relationship, and with the predictive power of




whereandare the average number of foreign and domestic mer-
gers in Canada, and A is the average number of domestic mergers in
I the United States. These averages are based on 1947 to 1951 when
predicting 1945 and 1946, and on 1955to1959 when predicting 1960
and 1961. In addition, the performance of the two relationships in
question was compared with these naive models for the full period,
employing mean values of M, N, and A for 1945 to 1961. Predictive
t power in these tests is measured by the square root of the average
deviation between the actual number of mergers and the number esti-
mated from the relationship, i.e.,
(actual—estimated)2
•- 'Vnumber of observations
The results of this test may be summarized as follows:
) (a) Equation (10) is a better predictor than equation (11) and any
of the naive models of the years immediately preceding or following the
subperiods specified for the tests.49
(b) The root mean of the squared deviations of the actual from the
• estimated number of mergers falls within the standard error of estimate
- ofequation (10); it is more than twice the standard error of estimate
for equation (11).
) (c)Theestimated coefficients for the subperiod equations are much
- morestable for equation (10) than for equation (11).
(d) Both estimates outperform the naive models for the full period
1945 to 1961. As one would expect from the higher value of R2, equa-
tion (11) also outperforms equation (10) by a small margin for the full
period.
Equation(10) is slightly inferior to the predictions based on two of the naive models
1945—46 but much superior to any of the naive models for 1960—61.r.
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7SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
PERHAPS the most serious deficiencies that run through most of the
preceding analysis are: (a) lack of a tightly knit, fully specified, testable
theory of business behavior as it relates to merger activity, and (b)
lackof reliable data that would make it feasible tb run more rigorous
empirical tests, not only on any new and better theories that might be
developed but also on the adhoc workadaytheories that are the com-
mon currency in this area at present. Although the data on which the
foregoing discussion is based represent a considerable extension in the
information available on foreign take-overs in Canada, it is evident that
many dark corners remain. In order to illuminate the subject more
clearly, more comprehensive and up-to-date information of better qua!-
ity is required on a wide range of variables for descriptive, as well as
analytical, purposes.
Secondly, it is evident that only a limited range of questions have
been considered in this paper and that other important aspects of the
issue of foreign ownership and control have not been considered, e.g.,
questions relating to the policies, practices, and performance of for-
eign-controlled firms; the benefits of foreign investment; and so forth.
Some of these questions have been explored by other authors.5°
Subject to these caveats, what are some of the main implications
and conclusions to be drawn from the analysis? One is methodological.
As noted at the outset, a central feature of the approach adopted has
been to evaluate foreign take-overs in relation to domestic take-overs
occurring at the same time, on the ground that the approach places
foreign take-overs within the appropriate framework of economic anal-
ysis, provides a clearer perspective on the phenomenon, and enhances
the testing power of available analytical tools.
On the substantive side, the analysis suggests that variations in the
number of take-overs are partly explained over time by the level of
merger activity in the United States, and that variations across in-
dustries are roughly proportional to the existing pattern of foreign con-
50SeeSafanan, op. cit.,and the referencescitedthere; and Rudolph G. Penner,"The
Benefits of Foreign Investment in Canada, 1950 to 1956," The Canadian Journal of
Economics and Political Science (May, 1966), pp. 172—183.FOREIGN TAKE-OVER OF DOMESTIC coMPANIEs: CANADA •501
trol among industries. In addition to these "exogenous" variables,
variations in the number of foreign take-overs appear to be sensitive
to a number of policy variables: tariff policy; the flow of internally gen-
te eratedcorporate funds, which is influenced by government financial
le policies; and the level of business activity, which is conditioned by
•
government stabilization policies.
iS Viewed within the context of the literature on direct foreign in-
vestment and industrial organization, neither of the two "exogenous"
•n- variables noted above has received much, if any,attention. At one place
ie or another, limited attention has been given to the three policy variables
mentioned. The influence of tariff policy has been noted in the literature
•at on direct investment, and the level of economic activity has been
re pointed to as an influence on domestic merger activity. Relatively little
attention has been given to internal cash flows in either branch of the
literature. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the foregoing anal-
ysis raises some doubts concerning the influence of a number of other
-ie variables that appear in the literature as factors affecting mergers and
direct foreign investment—e.g., growth; economies of scale; size; re-
search and development; and changes in United States antitrust laws
r- and law enforcement.
h. Within the context of Canadian economic policy, the evidence sug-
gests a number of general conclusions. First, only a relatively small
IS portion of the level of foreign control of Canadian industry in 1962 is
il. attributable to take-overs per se from 1945 to 1961. Secondly, relative
•IS to the number of firms in Canada, the number of take-overs has been
rs small. Thirdly, though differing somewhat, the characteristics of for-
eign take-overs may be considered to be broadly similar to those of
domestic take-overs, not exhibiting characteristics that pose obvious
causes for alarm.
Finally, there is the question of what, if any, attention has been
given to foreign take-overs in formulating policy, and what influence
'of policies have had on take-over activity. In Canada, it seems fair to say
• that in the past, each of the policy variables noted above has been reg-
ulated largely without recognition of the relationship between these
•he variablesand take-over activity or its importance. Failure to recognize
•of
: therelationships in question has frequently given rise to paradoxical
situations where the strongest advocates of economic nationalism es-502INTERNATIONAL MOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
pouse, in one context, policies that, in another, have indirectly tended jr
toincrease the foreign take-overs which they oppose. Evidence of such
situations may be found in the record of Canadian tariff policies,5' as
well as in the record of Canadian fiscal,52 monetary, and debt-manage-•
ment policies.53
Aside from providing yet another illustration of the universal
principle that everything is related to everything else, the record of
Canadian policy during this period suggests that active concern about
foreign take-overs adds still a further objective to the already over-
loaded objective function of government, further complicating the ex-
ercise of tariff, fiscal, monetary, and debt-management policies. For
this additional objective to be allowed for rationally in formulating
policies, it is evident that more must be known about foreign direct
investment and take-overs than is currently the case.
The authorsare unaware of any suggestions that tariff reductions be implemented
to reduce foreign investment and take-overs. There is some evidence of attempts to use
the tariff to increase the inflow of direct investment. This usually is expressed in words
to the effect that if Canada reduces its tariffs without taking additional steps, investors
will locate their plants in the United States and export to Canada rather than maintaining
and expanding their Canadian plants. This concern was voiced, for example, in dis-
cussions of the Canada—U.S. automotive agreement. See Wonnacott and Wonnacott,
op.cit., AppendicesA and B.
52RoyalCommission on Taxation, Report.Ottawa,1966, Vol. VI. pp. 158—162. See
also the papers by R. A. Musgrave and Arnold C. Harberger reviewing the Reportin
TheCanadian Journalof Economics (February, 1968), pp. 178—182 and pp. 186—194.
Themost striking paradox is, perhaps, evident in the case of monetary and debt-
management policy. In common with most countries, Canada pursued increasingly re-
strictive monetary and debt-management policies from 1945 to 1961. Two features,
however, particularly distinguish Canadian policy during the late 1950's. One was a
massive Conversion Loan in 1958, which, in the course of three months, increased the
average term to maturity on the public debt from eight years to fourteen years nine
months. The second was the very tight monetary policies pursued from 1958 to 1961
while the unemployment rates ranged from 5.5 to 7.8 per cent, averaging 6.8 per cent.
Both measures tended to reduce corporate liquidity and raise the cost of capital. En
addition, these restrictive policies tended to increase the number of commercial failures.
From both standpoints, therefore, our evidence suggests that the policies in question
tended to increase the number of foreign take-overs. The paradox is that all of this oc-
curred under the aegis of a government that came to office in 1957 on a platform of re-
ducing, or at least arresting, the growth of foreign control over Canadian industry—a
policy that was actively supported by the then Governor of the Bank of Canada..1
APPENDIX
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Selected Estimates of Equation (5) for Two Subperiods: 1950—55, 1956—61
(NB,or NH=a+f3FN,+
NOTE: Equations explaining NB, exclude furniture and tobacco; equa-
tions explaining NH, exclude rubber, furniture, tobacco, and petroleum. These
industries were excluded from these equations because either the numerator
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COMMENTS
ROBERT E. LIPSEY
QUEENS COLLEGE AND NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
Asseveral papers make clear, portfolio-adjustment or stock-
adjustment models are certainly "in" as a way of analyzing foreign
investment. Prachowny makes a good case for concluding that this ap-
proach is logical for direct investment as well as for financial invest-
ment. In the end, however, I find the model that he produces, neat as it
is, unconvincing for two reasons. First, I do not think that it catches
most of the motivations for direct investment. Second, even if the
model were good in theoretical terms, the data used for estimating the
coefficients are so far from the variables that they are supposed to
represent that I am highly skeptical regarding his interpretation of the
coefficients and their use for policy recommendations.
The basis for his model is the argument that the share of its assets
a firm will hold abroad depends on the relative rates of return at home
and in foreign countries, adjusted for the relative risk. The model
offers no theory as to why foreign investment becomes more or less
profitable relative to domestic, but, rather, puts forward an explana-
tion of the way in which corporations react to differences in the profit-
ability of investment. As Prachowny states, it would be hard to find a
theory that categorically denies the assumptions that he makes, al-
though his contention is really true only until he defines his variables
more precisely.
Even at this general level, there is an unstated assumption —notso
much in the theoretical model as in the realization—which I think
illegitimate. This is that the foreign and domestic operations of a
company, or of all companies together, are essentially independent.
The foreign investment does not affect domestic profitability, and
domestic investment does not affect foreign profitability. Without this
assumption, the author could not argue that the relevant return on
foreign investment is the ratio of profits earned abroad to investment
abroad. If the investment abroad adds to domestic profits, or domestic
investment adds to foreign profits, the model is seriously undermined.COMMENT BY LIPSEY•505
Whilethe assumption may be valid in some cases, it must surely be
invalid for others. Domestic profitability for some companies must be
affected by foreign investments in, say, copper mining or petroleum, or
banana production; or by foreign manufacturing which competes with
exports or domestic sales, or promotes exports (an automobile as-
sembly plant). Presumably the company will consider the impact on
total profit, domestic or foreign, of any investment here or abroad.
Perhaps this is what the author had in mind in his theoretical discus-
sion, since he speaks only of the expected rate of return on each type
of asset, without defining the rate.
When we come to the empirical implementation of the model, we
are in a world that often I do not recognize. It is assumed that the
desired stock of assets is achieved within a year, on the ground that
titles to direct investment assets "can be bought and sold with not
much more difficulty than other long-term portfolio assets." That
seems highly unlikely if one thinks, for example, of the time required
to develop new sources of minerals, or of the difficulty of selling an
assembly plant geared to American cars to a European or Japanese
producer. The author himself says later that direct investment assets
"rarely enter the market," a fact which suggests that such assets are
not readily traded.
The variable for the stock of American direct investment abroad
is the estimate by the U.S. Department of Commerce of the book
value of this investment, and it is compared with the market value of
corporate stock outstanding in the United States to show the share of
corporate assets invested abroad. As is pointed out, a book value is
being compared with a market value here, but the consequences of that
disparity are not noted. There is probably a serious downward bias in
the estimate of direct-investment assets, since Canadian and U.K.
stock prices almost tripled over the period covered, and prices of
equities in other countries rose by similar amounts. In the face of this
rise, the residual change in the estimated value of American direct
investment—that is, the change other than that from investment flows
and reinvested earnings—was negative in all but two years, a strong
indication that capital gains from this source did not enter the estimates
or that American firms were making very poor investments.
Not only the trend but the year-to-year fluctuations in the ratio506•INTERNATIONALMOBILITY AND MOVEMENT OF CAPITAL
of holdings of foreign assets to holdings of domestic assets reflect this
mixture of book values and market values. The large decline from 1953
to 1955, for example, results from the rapid rise in stock prices during
those years, and the major increases in the ratio reflect poor perform-
ance of the stock market in the United States, as in 1953, 1957, 1960,
1962, and 1966. Of course, these stock-price movements may reflect
current or anticipated changes in profits, but I suspect that relation-
ship is not what the author had in mind.
The earnings variables seem to have a similarly odd relationship.
The foreign earnings relate to all types of direct investment, including
investments in natural-resource industries such as petroleum. The
• domestic-earnings rate applies only to manufacturing, and the ratio
between them may be as likely to reflect the relation of petroleum
• earnings to manufacturing earnings as the ratio of foreign to domestic
earnings.
• Aside from the differences in coverage between the two earnings
series, I am skeptical of the earnings data in general. These are, after
all, comparisons of earnings within the same companies, as shown on
the books of these companies. There must be a good deal of leeway for
a company in allocating profits to the affiliate or to the parent, as tax or
other considerations dictate, by determining intracompany prices,
charges for services, and other elements of cost. If that is the case,
it is hard to be sure that the earnings comparisons we see are the ones
that govern the investment policy of the companies.
• These rates of return are adjusted for the risk involved in each
• type of investment, the risk being measured by the variability of the
earnings rate in the time series. I doubt that this measures the main
elements of risk involved in foreign operations, which I would take to
be that of expropriation or other hostile actions by host governments;
or, in some industries, of actions by other countries (including the
United States) that affect the size of the market an affiliate can serve.
To capture the risks facing an investor, a cross-sectional measure
reflecting the range of experiences within an industry might be more
appropriate than a time-series measure.
If! am correct in thinking that the variables used here—and, there-
fore, the coefficients obtained—do not measure what they are sup-
posed to measure, what do they represent? The level of direct-invest-
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ment assets rose very steadily throughout the period, without many
changes in the rate of growth. The level of the value of stock out-
standing of American companies, however, showed large changes in
rates of growth and declined in several years, and the movement of
this series can be traced largely, although not entirely, to changes in
stock prices. Thus, the fluctuations in the ratio of foreign to domestic
assets largely represent fluctuations in stock prices in the United
States.
The independent variable representing the ratio of foreign to do-
mestic earnings mainly reflects the fluctuations of domestic earnings,
since direct-investment earnings abroad were comparatively stable, at
least after 1958. It seems quite possible, then, that the relationship
betweendomestic/foreign-earningsratiosand thecorresponding
asset-holdings ratios reflects the impact of changes in corporate earn-
ings in the United States upon stock prices, and that no effect on direct
investment is caught here at all, except to the extent that movements of
stock prices might affect direct investment.
Despite these criticisms, I think that the approach to analyzing
direct-investment decisions through discrepancies between desired
and actual holdings of direct-investment assets is potentially a revealing
one. Perhaps the variable to be explained should be, in fact, the rate of
flow of new capital from the United States, as in the flow models
described, or the rate of expenditure onplantand equipment, since
these variables are under the control of individual companies. The
ratio of foreign to total assets is only partially under the control of the
parent companies, and the amount of investment required to reach an
"appropriate" ratio in some sense is absurdly large at times. To keep
the ratio constant between 1953 and 1954, for example, would have
required an investment of over $7 billion at a time when the annual
outflow was averaging something more like $700 million. A fairly long
period should, therefore, be allowed in the model for adjustment to the
desired investment levels.
The main problem in Prachowny's paper is one that afflicts quite
a few of the other papers put forward at this conference. The authors
have, for the most part, tried to follow the virtuous route of creating
a theoretically sensible model and then estimating an empirical
counterpart, carefully avoiding fishing expeditions that might landr
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variables that are statistically significant but not part of the model.
However, since at least some of the variables in the model have no
empirical counterpart, the creators of the model must search for
proxies, some of which are related to the corresponding variables in
the model mainly by hope. The proxies are then renamed to present
them as the proper variables. In effect, the fishing expedition has been
transformed from fishing for variables to fishing for proxies, and I am
not sure the degree of virtue achieved is as great as is sometimes
claimed.
The paper by Reuber and Roseman is somewhat difficult to com-
ment on in any general way, owing to the lack of a theoretical struc-
ture to explain differences in take-over rates among industries. Various
attempts are made to account for the rate of merger activity, but I
miss here what several of the other papers included: some definition
of the goals that the firm is attempting to reach by its merger activity,
and an explanation of why there should be differences among industries
in either the goals or their effects on merger activity. My main com-
ments, then, are on the specific empirical findings and on the questions
which they raise.
A problem with the data in general is the reliance on numbers of
mergers, rather than on the aggregate assets or employment involved,
for many of the analyses. There is an advantage to this procedure, in
that single large cases do not overwhelm the evidence of many smaller
examples, but there is also the disadvantage that it is difficult to assay
the significance of numbers for the activity of the economy without
some measures of the values involved.
One finding mentioned in Section 2 is that the number of take-
overs of Canadian firms by firms in the United States is small compared
with the number of take-overs by Canadian firms, particularly in view
of the much greater number of firms in the United States. This corn-
parison may be affected by differences in the definition of a firm in the
two countries, and by the industrial composition of each one's business
population. The United States might have, for example, many more f
smallbanks, retail stores, private landlords, and others who inflate
the figure for the total number of firms.
Since 73 per cent of the foreign acquisitions of Canadian firmsCOMMENT BY LIPSEY• 509
were made by Canadian affiliates of foreign firms, it is obvious that the
tendency toward such take-overs was far stronger among firms already
in Canada than among the general run of firms in the United States. It
might be interesting to compare take-overs by Canadian-owned firms
with those by foreign-owned Canadian firms to test whether the latter
show the same propensity toward growth by merger as do the domes-
tically owned firms.
The question of industrial composition may also affect another of
the results. Foreign mergers are shown to be vertical, both forward and
backward, to a much greater extent than are domestic mergers, while
domestic mergers are predominantly horizontal. It is not clear from the
data presented here (although it may be in the original source) whether
this difference between foreign and domestic firms reflected their
ownership or only their industry composition, since the type of merger
may be dependent on the industry to a large extent.
The main part of the paper is an analysis of the factors determining
the share of foreign-owned companies in merger activity within in-
dividual industries, as represented, once again, by numbers of mergers.
One of the variables used is the share of foreign ownership in the num-
ber of existing firms, but I believe that there is a misinterpretation of
the coefficients of the equations in the first statement of the results.
Given the relation
where is the share of foreign firms in mergers and FN, is their
share in ownership, /3 =1is said to imply that "foreign ownership,
per Se, has little influence on the interindustry distribution of foreign
merger activity." On the contrary, if the k2ishigh, the distribution of
foreign ownership determines the distribution of foreign merger ac-
tivity in this case. We can say, however, if we ignore the constant
• term in the equations, that a coefficient of one implies that foreign
• ownership does not affect the level of total merger activity in an in-
dustry, since foreign and domestic firms have the same propensity to
merge. A coefficient greater than unity implies that foreign firms have
a higher propensity toward mergers than domestic ones, and that for-
eign ownership works to increase the tendency toward mergers.
A second variable found to be significant, in general, is the nominalr
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level of tariffs, as represented by the ratio of tariff collections to total
or dutiable imports in the industry. These ratios are subject to the
objections usually made to such measures of the tariff level in com-
parisons among countries: a tariff high enough to exclude a product
does not appear in this calculation at all; and any high tariff, by reduc-
ing imports of the product subject to it, reduces the weight of that prod-
uct in the tariff ratio. Thus, of two industries with the same average
tariff rates on pretariff imports, the one with a mixture of very high
and very low rates may appear to have a lower average tariff level after
the imposition of the tariff, because its tariffs distorted the composition
of trade to a greater degree, shifting it toward the low-tariff items.
In a number of cases, it would be interesting to know what the
results would have been had the share in assets, rather than the share
in numbers of firms, been used as the independent variable. This might
be a reasonable way of estimating even the number of mergers if a
firm with $100 million in assets is ten times as likely to take over
another firm as one with $10 million in assets. Relating the share in
the number of firms to the share in the number of mergers seems to
imply that larger firms will make larger mergers —butno more mergers
—thansmall firms.
It does not seem overly surprising that the tariff level does not
have much influence on NH,, intraindustry mergers. Since most
firms in the United States involved in mergers are already established
in the given industry, they have already taken advantage of the tariff,
and it is not clear that a merger within the industry would add anything
to that advantage. It might be more likely that the tariff level would
influence the number of take-overs by firms in the United States not
previously in the Canadian industry.
Another possibility for the tariff variable would be changes in the
level of tariffs. One might suppose that the degree of ownership by
firms in the United States at any time represents some adaptation to
tariffs and other economic circumstances. A take-over implies that the
adaptation was incomplete. Would it not be sensible to expect that one
would find foreign take-overs more frequent at a given tariff level when
that level represents a large increase over the past level than when it
represents a long-standing tariff? This is particularly logical because a
take-over is a way of adding capacity quickly, instead of slowly fromI.
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internal growth, and might be thought of as the expected response to
• an unexpected change in circumstances.
Among the variables that failed to explain the distribution of merg-
• ers was the relation between the average size of foreign-owned firms
• and the average size of all firms in the industry, the expectation being
• that where foreign-owned firms are larger, they will be subject to fewer
financial constraints and more able to take over Canadian firms. Prob-
ably the relevant variable here would not be the size of the Canadian
affiliate of the American firm but the size of the latter, since this size
would determine the ability to raise funds for take-overs. Such a vari-
able would be fairly easy to insert in an equation, the expectation being
• that firms in the United States would account for a relatively high
• proportion of mergers in those industries in which the parent corn-
• panics are particularly large relative to Canadian companies.
RONALDI. McKINNON
STANFORDUNIVERSITY
A number of logical and statistical problems in Prachowny's
analysis create difficulty in interpreting his empirical results. These
difficulties seem endemic in estimating flows of foreign investment in
general, and direct investment in particular.
UTILITY, DEMAND, AND NET WORTH
Prachowny starts off by specifying a utility function U(R), which
he does not use to generate his asset-demand function (page 444) as
given below; that depends on much more than R:
A1 =AL(R1,R2, °R2' W),
where W A1+ A2.
Since the utility function is not spelled out, neither is the maxi-
mization process which motivates the representative corporation.
Hence, the reader is given no guidance as to what a priori restriction.4
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one might impose on the form of the demand function. Specifically,
• given the known limitations of mean-variance analysis —notto mention
mean-variance-covariance analysis—it would be nice to know what
• could plausibly be assumed. For example, is the corporation maximiz-
• ing expected utility through time (appropriately discounted), or is it
maximizing the present net worth of its outstanding common shares,
or is it maximizing the market value of all its outstanding securities?
Perhaps all of these maxima lead to the same estimating equation, but
the reader is left in the dark as to whether this is true.
In the actual estimation procedure, Prachowny imposes the con-
dition that the elasticity of A1 with respect to W is unity, but there is
no a priori justification provided. Intuitively, one feels that it would
not be plausible for a firm in the middle of an overseas diversification
• program (which might take several years to complete) to keep the value
of its net worth abroad proportional to domestic net worth.
• Much direct investment overseas has been largely financed by
overseas bond issues and bank-borrowing by the parent firm, which
• then uses the proceeds to set up, or invest in, a subsidiary. Again, the
relationship to the net worth of the parent firm hardly seems binding
in choosing the level of overseas investment. This kind of financial
manipulation is important for testing the effectiveness of the U.S. vol-
untary restraint program, as the author does later on, because it would
be a form of direct investment which complies with the program and
which, indeed, was induced by the program. A well worked-out utility
function or maximization procedure would be a big help in isolating
• these issues.
The author makes a useful point in showing that certain flow var-
iables —suchas reinvested earnings and capital outflows —cannotbe
• used formally to predict complete changes in the balance-sheet posi-






C =correctionfor windfalls, expropriations, and other unexpected
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But,unfortunately, he includes depreciation flows in C and sug-
gests that companies "may want to offset depreciation during the pe-
riod by new capital flows." However, if overseas earnings are accounted
for correctly, they are net of depreciation, and there is no need for con-
tinuously compensating capital outflows.
THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES
Consider the estimating equation which Prachowny used:
+ U.
The construction of R7 (per cent earnings on direct investment
abroad) and(per cent earnings on United States manufacturing) is
not discussed in detail, but it appears as if these signify current profits
divided by the market valuation of net worth. In the case of R7, book
value of foreign assets had to be used although the author would have
preferred their market valuation. Thus,cannot represent the "real"
rates of return on the underlying physical assets.
For example, if profitability goes up in home investment and this
increase in profitability is perceived as such, the stocks will be revalued
upward, so that the apparent rate of return is unchanged. Correspond-
ingly, swings in stock-market valuations could introduce large differ-
ences in R, andwhich are as hard to interpret as the animal spirits
that guide year-to-year fluctuations in the stock market. Thus, the im-
mediate implications of short-term variance in R,, denoted by the trun-
catedare difficult to see. The use of is a complete puzzle, not
discussed anywhere by the author. Given the data and conceptual dif-
ficulties in constructing R7 and R1, one might like to run each sepa-
rately to see which one was providing the explanation.
The deficit of the United States in its balance of payments on a
liquidity basis—lagged one period—is included as a measure of risk.
There are all kinds of questions regarding the liquidity definition. Wit-
ness 1968 and 1969, when the liquidity deficit became very large even
by past standards, but the official-settlements measure of the balance
showed a surplus. From a purely statistical point of view, the use of
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cedureas long as thereis some year-to-year correlation in the B's. The
author makes some additional ad hoc adjustments in his estimating
procedures to get a "better lit," but it is beyond my capacity to judge
their statistical verity.
A principal consideration in setting up stock-adjustment models
has been to avoid the necessity of specifying instantaneous adjustment
within the time period for which data are collected. One can look at
observed flows over several periods as an adjustment to a preferred
stock position. This would seem to be important here, as one would
not expect firms to adjust their portfolios of direct investment within
one year if there was a change in foreign relative to domestic profit-
ability. Yet Prachowny does not make lagged adjustment a significant
part of his model, as he himself notes.
In conclusion, I am quite prepared to believe, with Prachowny,
that the voluntary restraint program was not effective, but I have not
reached this conclusion on the basis of the analysis provided here. It
is difficult to generate believable models which predict capital flows
and direct investment in isolation from other international payments.
THE NORTH AMERICAN ECONOMY
The paper by Reuber and Roseman examines the merger activities
of American firms in Canada. Their analysis is virtually unique in terms
of the comprehensiveness of the data and the thoroughness of the sta-
tistical procedures used to test various hypotheses. Although Canada
is significantly different from most other recipients of foreign direct
investment, it has had long historical experience in this area, and for-
eign direct investment has been very large. Mergers or take-overs rep-
resent an important part of that investment. The contribution of the
two authors is a significant one, both for Canada and for its implications
elsewhere.
In order to project the Canadian experience for other countries,
it is necessary to decide whether Canada behaves simply as part of the
North American economy or has, in fact, some relevant characteristics
of its own which set it apart as a distinct economy. Here the authors
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1.The ratio of foreign to domestic mergers in Canada has been
of the order of 1:2, whereas the ratio of the numbers of firms
in the United States and in Canada has been of the order of
12: 1. It is, however, difficult to get an appropriate measure of
geographical proximity. It could well be that, within certain
regions of the United States, the ratio of "foreign" to "domes-
tic" mergers is closer to the ratio for Canada. It also appears
that take-overs in Canada by firms in the United States were
only 2.6 per cent of total mergers in the United States, whereas
the Canadian economy is probably about 8 per cent of the size
of the American one.
2. On the other hand, waves of merger activity within the United
Sates through time seem to be fairly strongly reflected in Can-
ada, and the authors use an index of total mergers in the United
States to explain a high proportion of the variance in Canadian
mergers through time. Without a more fundamental explana-
tion, this would suggest that there are similar forces operating
in both economies, while Canada still maintains a distinctive
economic identity for this purpose.
COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE
Oneinteresting aspect of the analysis is the tendency for owner-
ship by American firms in Canada to concentrate and stabilize in par-
ticular industries, even if one disaggregates down past the two-digit
industries. Those sectors of mineral extraction and manufacturing
which were dominated by foreigners prior to 1945 remain dominated
by subsequent merger activity and internal growth. Oil and gas ex-
ploration and automobile manufacturing are extreme examples. Cor-
respondingly, there is only a limited tendency for foreign firms to branch
out into other activities.
Foreign domination seems particularly marked in what might be
called "tradable"-goods sectors, inclusive of manufacturing and min-
eral extraction, but it is less strong in the nontradables sector, where
services are heavily represented. This tendency seems to be borne out
by the positive correlation between foreign merger activity and tariff
¶
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barriers, as one would predict from the old "tariff factory" argument.
That is, those manufacturing industries with higher tariffs are more
subject to foreign take-overs. This is welcome statistical support for a
venerable hypothesis.
Within the tradable-goods sectors, it would be interesting togo
further into explaining why foreigners may have competitive advan-
tages in some areas, but not in others. I realize that this more general
investigation of foreign comparative advantagemay lead the authors
too far afield from their announced intention of simply explaining
merger activity. However, if there is a tendency for foreign control to
stabilize and limit itself to particular activities, this would be valuable
information for countries where foreign direct investment is as yet less
pronounced than it is in Canada.
THE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINT
The impact on merger activity of an internal financial constraint
within Canadian firms was particularly interesting to me. The authors
show, in equations (10) and (12), that both domestic and foreignmergers
are quite sensitive to the internally generated flow of funds. The fact
that mergers seem to take place with the least immediately profitable,
or illiquid, Canadian firms is contrary to prevailing Canadian mythol- •'
ogy.Moreover, if we could construct proxy variables for the relative
tightness of credit in the two countries, we would expect tightmoney-
market conditions in Canada vis-à-vis the United States to bean im-
portant determinant of merger activity and new direct investment. Un-
fortunately, interest-rate proxies may be quitepoor measures of ease
or tightness. Notwithstanding this, the authors do find some statistical
evidence (equation (11), page 495)thatthe American rate of interest is
negatively correlated with foreign mergers.
If the absence of internal funds and the inadequacy of domestic
money markets are important reasons for the acceptance of mergers
tc
—particularlyforeign ones—on the part of Canadian firms, this would
suggest that Canada might be less prone to foreign take-overs than
would be a less developed economy with amore primitive banking sys-
tern. Even Canada may have followed financial policies which arti-COMMENT BY MCKINNON • 517
ficiallyaccentuated foreign mergers. In the 1945—6 1 period, there was
a low ceiling (approximately 7 per cent) on what Canadian commercial
banks could charge for loans. This, of course, led to substantial non-
interest rationing, which might partially explain why the authors could
not get a significant Canadian interest-rate variable. During the latter
part of the period under consideration, Canada was subjected to un-
usuallytight and disruptive monetary policies by James Coyne,
Governor of the Bank of Canada. Taken together, the effects of these
two factors on foreign take-overs may have been not insignificant.
To help one understand fully the importance of the financial con-
straint in foreign take-over activity, it would have been desirable had
the authors obtained information on the net financial transfers (or bal-
ance-of-payments effect) of a given amount of foreign direct invest-
ment—since foreign direct investment could, in principle, be financed
from the Canadian money market. However, they have tried, and this
material was not available. One can speculate that a badly functioning
domestic banking system would not only attract direct investment from
abroad, but make it easier for large, well-known international corpora-
tions to get local finance by issuing bonds or commercial paper. Lesser
known, but possibly quite efficient, domestic entrepreneurs may be
shut out because of ceilings on bank deposit and lending rates.
In summary, Reuber and Roseman have succeeded admirably in
their goal of showing how monetary and tariff policy may have accen-
tuated merger activity in Canada. Their analysis immediately suggests
how the greater distortions in foreign trade and finance in less-devel-
oped countries may—in the absence of other inhibiting controls—ac-
centuate direct investment there far beyond the level which could be
described as socially or economically optimal.
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